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TheTheoretical Structure
of the Analysis
2.1 BASIC THEORETICAL ISSUES
Themajor difficulty encountered in the assessment of the
differential effects of a substitution of one tax (VAT) for
another (CIT)'is the isolation of the effects of the change
in tax structure from the effects of other simultaneous changes.
Thus, John Bossons has stated that "one of the most frequent
sources of spurious issues [in evaluating tax substitutions]is the
confusion of macroeconomic control problems with problems of tax
structure" [Bossons, p. 255]. More generally, Carl Shoup has argued
that, in a context of multiple goals, the effects of a tax substitution
on the achievement of one goal can only be assessed by making
simultaneous changes in other fiscal instruments sufficient to main-
tain presubstitution levels of other goal variables [Shoup, 1970, pp.
12-15].
Of course, the difficulty is that such a multidimensional differ-
ential incidence analysis requires both a completely specified general
equilibrium approach and a knowledge of the "goals" of the tax
substitution, neither of which is available to the analyst concerned
with the evaluation of a VAT-CIT substitution. Even the achieve-
ment of aggregative neutrality is beyond the confines of the input-
output model used in this study. Rather than requiring as a condition
1. Throughout this study, the reduction or repeal of the CIT refers to the
total CIT in the United States economy, that is, the federal CIT and the CIT
of those states that impose this tax. "Government" refers, therefore, to the
combined federal-state government. But the VAT is assumed to be imposed only
by the federal government (see Chapter 7, section 1).
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ofthe tax substitution that the level of real income and output be
unchanged, the input-output model imposes this as an assumption,
i.e., the final demand vector is assumed to be exogenously given and
unaffected by the tax substitution. It should be emphasized that this
constraint seriously limits the practical usefulness of the results,
especially to the extent that division of the final demand vector
between investment and consumption goods is likely to be sub-
stantially altered by the tax changes examined.
As a result of these conceptual and empirical limitations, the
analysisis confined to the first-round consequences of the tax
substitution. However, even though the model is restricted to a
rather simple representation of interdependent economic processes, a
number of difficult theoretical and conceptual issues arise. In this
chapter, we discuss the most important of these issues, their specific
representation in an input-output model, and the restrictive assump-
tions incorporated in the model.
Criteriafor a Compensating Tax Substitution.Between the
extremes of simple equal monetary yield of the two tax instruments
and simultaneous adjustments in a sufficiently large set of instru-
ments to offset any unintentional consequences of the tax substitu-
tion, a number of compensatory criteria can be developed. The
issue reduces to the identification of a criterion which limits the
response as much as possible to the change in tax structure (as
opposed, e.g., to implicit changes in stabilization policy) but does
not exceed our analytical capabilities.
Alternative Variants of the Value-Added Tax. The VAT can
take on a number of different forms, each of which has significantly
different economic consequences. Although the empirical analysis
is limited to examination of a VAT of the consumption type, it
is important to point out the substantive differences between alter-
native variants.
Price Determination and Tax Shifting. The consequences of the
tax substitution ultimately follow from the change in tax rates, the
effect of these changes on prices, and the responses of producers
and consumers to these tax-rate and price adjustments. Further-
more, unless the responses of prices to tax changes can be identified,
criteria for a compensatory tax substitution cannot be concretely
specified and realized.
Fiscal Implications of the Tax Substitution. On the basis of the
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tospecify concretely the elements entering the compensation cr1-
tenon, thus determining a VAT rate which just compensates, in
terms of the government budget balance, for the reduction or re-
peal of the CIT.
To place this discussion in context the tax substitution used in
this analysis must be briefly outlined: a uniform (proportionate)
reduction from the initial average CIT rate in each industry is as-
sumed.2 The VAT then imposed is to be invoiced on all sales, on the
basis of the VAT-exclusive value. The VAT is assumed to be applied
on a destination basis, with exports exempted and the VAT applied
to imports as a border tax. As the VAT is of the consumption type,
a refund is permitted for VAT invoiced on business purchases, in.
cluding gross investment. The VAT is set at a ratethatallows the
government to purchase the original (presubstitution) bill of goods
and services at the new (postsubstitution) prices without incurring
a change inits nominal (i.e., money) budget surplus or deficit.
2.2CRITERIA FOR A COMPENSATING
VAT-CIT SUBSTITUTION
Anumber of considerations entered into our selection of a com-
pensation criterion,as we tried to bridge gaps between what is
theoretically desirable and actually feasible:
The goals of the VAT-CIT substitution actualy are not clear. Ad-
vocates have stressed a range of real or imagined benefits which
would flow from this change in tax structure. However, a funda-
mental uncertainty exists concerning the actual implications of this
fiscal change. One purpose of an analysis of this change is to identify
these implications; the compensation criterion should then be de-
signed to bring out, rather than disguise, obscure, or define away,
the differential impacts of these two taxes.
The compensation criterion should clearly avoid the merging of
changes in macroeconomic stabilization policy with changes in tax
structure. Expansion or contraction of government budgets could
2. The CIT rate reduction utilized in the analysis is somewhat artificial.
First, since state and federal corporate income tax liabilities could not be em-
pirically separated at the level of input-output sectors, it has been necessary
to assume that the reduction applies to the total corporate tax liability. More
seriously, the reduction is expressed in terms of effectiverates(actual average
tax liabilities, i.e., ratios of CIT to profit), which bear no simple or consistent
relationship to statutory corporate tax rates. This will not introduce a bias into
the analysis if the simple fact of a reduction in nominal tax rates does not alter
the relationship between these and effective rates of tax. In any event, the
distortions resulting from this assumption should be of minor importance.30 Substituting a Value-Added Tax for the Corporate Income Tax
certainlybe achieved without reliance on a substitution of a VAT for
the CIT. Since our fundamental concern is with the differential con-
sequences of the tax substitution itself, it is necessary to focus the
analysis on a specific substitution which does not intermingle these
consequences with the consequences of overall changes in govern-
ment stabilization policy.
The compensation criterion must be consistent with analytical
capabilities. On the one hand, to be meaningful compensation must
be defined in terms of economic variables whose movements can be
captured by the underlying model. For example, a reasonable defini-
tion of aggregative neutrality would be unchanged total employ-
ment.3 However, to translate tax changes into changes in employ-
ment would require a well-developed representation of the labor
market, relating employment changes to tax-substitution-induced
changes in wages, capital-labor ratios, and output prices. Unfor-
tunately, we do not now have the analytical capabilities to trace out
these relationships.
On the other hand, the compensation criterion should include rele-
vant responses which can in fact be projected. Thus, to require only
that the monetary yield of the two taxes be equal, under the assump-
tion that, e.g., prices or corporate profits will be unchanged, repre-
sents a waste of available information if it is in fact possible to pro-
ject price and corporate profit changes resulting from the tax substi-
tution, and if these changes will alter tax revenue yields.
Finally, it could be argued that the compensation criterion should
be politically and legislatively relevant, since the purpose of studies
such as this one is the identification of an open-ended range of un-
compensated differential consequences of a potential change in the
tax structure.
Of the foregoing, the most important substantive objective in the
choice of a compensation criterion is the achievement of aggregative
neutrality. However, as noted above this cannot be required as a
condition of the tax substitution since it is imposed as an assumption
of the input-output model, given the stipulation of a fixed bill of
final demands. Thus, the analysis is forced to rely on a more rudi-
mentary criterion which would be consistent with (rather than
a reflection of)astable macroeconomic control policy.
Specifically, price changes that result from application of the cri-
terion chosen for determining a CIT.compensating VAT rate must be
a consequence only of the tax substitution and not of an overall ex-
3.This criterion has been employed in a study of alternatively-compensated
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pansionor contraction of the government budget. Since real govern-
ment demands for goods and services are assumed to be given, this
reduces to a search for a definition of unchanged effective revenue
yield. Four possible equal-budgetary-yield criteria can be proposed:
a. Equal Monetary Yield. Let C be the CIT revenue loss (either
from partial or full repeal of the CIT) and V be the VAT revenue
gain, including amounts attributed to purchases by the government.4
Equal monetary yield simply requires that C =V,a condition that
necessitates analysis of "money differential incidence" [Shoup,
1970, p. 13]. Obviously, this condition will entail an unequal real
yield of the tax substitution (not to mention of the tax system as
a whole, as indicated in b, below) if the prices of government-pur-
chased goods and services rise as a result of the tax substitution.
Thus, even if the CIT were the only tax employed initially, a con-
stant bill of goods and services could be maintained only if the
government's deficit (surplus) increased (decreased). In the analysis
of money differential incidence, then, the effects of two govern-
ment budget changes are necessarily merged: the tax substitution and
an increase or decrease in deficit. In the present case, if Pg is the
government price index (in VAT-inclusive terms, compared to a pre-
VAT base of unity), itis unlikely that C =V/Pgwould also be
achieved when the yield criterion is C =V.
b. Equal Real Yield of the TaxChanges.Here itis required that
C = i.e., that the VAT revenue be adequate to command the
same real resources after the tax substitution as were previously
commanded by the CIT revenue forgone through CIT reduction or
repeal. But government-purchased goods and services are also fi-
nanced by tax sources other than the CIT. Consequently, if Pg
changes and if the original bill of goods and services is to be pur-
chased by the government, either the original net government budget
position will change (increase or decrease in deficit or surplus) or
rates of other taxes must be simultaneously increased or decreased.
Thus, this criterion is consistent with differential incidence analysis
only under some further stipulation regarding the nature of con-
comitant, compensating changes in all other tax rates. One possible
condition for simultaneous change in other taxes could be referred
4. Actual or imputed VAT on government purchases is included for logical
consistency: since the corporate profits resulting from sales to government are
subject to the CIT, parallel treatment suggests that VAT attributable to govern-
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toas "revenue source neutrality": all other tax rates should be
changed enough so that the proportion of total governmental rev-
enue derived from each revenue source is the same as before the tax
substitution.
It should be clearly understood that the analysis then concerns the
differential incidence of the VAT-CIT substitution and the simul-
taneous changes in other taxes; relative price changes and their
effects cannot be viewed as consequences of the tax substitution
alone. Nevertheless, equal real VAT-CIT yield and revenue source
neutrality appears to be a more interesting combination of budgetary
changes than equal monetary yield supplemented by changes in the
deficit (criterion a, above).5
c. Equal Real Budget Surplus or Deficit.LetB and G refer to
government revenue and expenditure; b, before the tax substitution;
a, after the substitution. With the relevant postsubstitution price
index P, this condition stipulates that (Rb -Gb)=(R0-
meaningthat the preexisting real fiscal imbalance is maintained after
the tax substitution.6
Under one conceivable interpretation, this condition is consistent
with differential incidence analysis (as described in condition b,
above) on the assumption that the surplus (deficit) will be used to
increase (reduce) governmental (private) expenditure in the future,
i.e., that the government is saving in order to increase, in later years,
government expenditure, or, via future lower taxes, private ex-
penditure, or is dissaving at the expense of future government or
(via future higher taxes) private expenditure. The relevant price
index for the evaluation of the real surplus or deficit then depends
upon the future use of the surplus or deficit, public or private, and
must reflect the impact of the tax substitution on these future
prices.
More likely, the government surplus or deficit does not reflect
savings or dissavings but instead is the result of overall government
5. Aaron clearly intends to employ the second criterion, although it is not
clear what assumptions he makes regarding changes in the real yields of other
taxes (rate changes versus increase in deficit). He is also ambiguous about the
price index used to evaluate real yields. In referring to government purchasing
power of the changed taxes he seems to imply a government price index, but
elsewhere he refers to four available alternatives: GNP deflator, government
expenditure deflator, wholesale price index, and retail (consumer) price index
[Aaron, pp. 165-166.].
6. .P,rather than Pg, is used to denote the "price index" because, as will
become clear, the appropriate index need not relate to changes in the prices of
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stabilization(macroeconomic control) policy. Under this interpreta-
tion, the criterion of equal real surplus implies some concept of
aggregative neutrality,i.e.,an avoidance of expansion or con-
traction in the economy. In this case the appropriate "price" index
must really be an index of the change in the surplus (deficit) required
to maintain the existing level of real aggregate demand. In fact, as
has been discussed, our model does not attempt to identify that
specific substitution which would be fiscally neutral. In view of the
probable effects of the substitution on investment (as discussed in
Chapter 5), it would indeed appear that a fiscally neutral substitu-
tion would require substantially higher VAT rates than the ones
estimated by this model.
d. Change in Revenue Equal to Change in Expenditure, or Equal
Monetary Surplus or Deficit.Underthis criterion VC + (PgG -
G)=C+ (Pg -1)G,where (Pg -1)Gis the change in govern-
ment expenditure due to the tax-substitution-induced price changes.
Equivalently, this criterion implies a constant monetary surplus or
deficit, i.e., (Rb —Gp.)=(R0Ga). This condition could simply
be referred to as (narrow) budgetary neutrality, with the VAT com-
pensating for both the nominal CIT revenue loss and the change in
government expenditures due to induced price changes. In the
present application of this criterion, itis assumed for reasons of
tractability that the nominal revenue yield of other tax sources is
unaffected by the tax substitution. In principle, the rates of other
taxes should be held constant, and the VAT rate should be set
sufficiently high to compensate for the tax-substitution-induced
changes in the nominal yields of these taxes as well as for the CIT
revenue loss and the price-change-induced increase in government
expenditure.
Of these four criteria the second (equal real yield) and fourth
(equal changes in revenue and expenditure) will be identical if
original government expenditure on goods and services equals the
amount of CIT revenue which is lost by the reduction in the CIT
rate (or by CIT repeal, if the rate is reduced to zero).7 The third and
fourth (equal real versus equal monetary surplus) will be identical
if the original government budget is in balance, but they will be quite
different if the government surplus or deficit islarge and prices
change significantly. Only under the fourth criterion is the VAT
7. This can be easily shown: Criterion d requires that G(Pg1) +C=V.
Criterion b requires that CV/Pg. For criteria d and b to be equivalent,
therefore, it is necessary that G(Pg1) +C=CPg,i.e., that G =C.34 Substituting a Value-Added Tax for the Corporate Income Tax
treatmentof government purchases a matter of indifference: since
the VAT on these purchases is simultaneously government revenue
and expenditure; whether government purchases are considered
subject to or exempt from the VAT will not alter the government
surplus or deficit. In all four cases, it is assumed that the tax sub-
stitution would have no significant consequences for the nominal
yields of other taxes, e.g., ad valorem sales taxes.
For our purposes criterion d seems perferable: It provides a more
interesting context than the "money differential incidence" of the
simultaneous tax and deficit change implied by the first criterion;
it appears to be more in line with legislative realities than the second,
which would in principle require simultaneous changes in all tax
rates,8 and it contrasts with the third, which would require un-
available knowledge regarding fiscal neutrality or the future use of
government (dis)savings. Our dominant consideration has simply
been to achieve a differential incidence analysis of changes in the
tax structure consistent with legislative-political realism. For these
reasons, we used the fourth criterion, a constant nominal surplus or
deficit (or alternatively stated, a net change in revenue equal to the
substitution-induced change in expenditure).
2.3THE CONSUMPTION-TYPE VAT
AND ALTERNATIVES
Theconsequences of a complete or partial replacement of the CIT
by a VAT will depend crucially on the precise characteristics of the
tax substitution. Identification of the specific CIT change is rela-
tively straightforward: it is assumed that the existing characteristics
of the CIT as reflected in observed differentials between nominal
and actual (or effective) rates, are unaltered by the tax substitution.
Thus, the analysis concerns the complete or partial replacement of
the existing U.S. CIT (federal and state), rather than an idealized
CIT, by the VAT.
The same procedure cannot be employed for the VAT, since it is
8. As indicated, itis assumed, for simplicity, that nominal yields of other
taxes are unaffected by the tax substitution; a more appropriate assumption
would be that other tax ratesareunaffected. In the initial incidence analysis
presented here, the distortion is limited to (a) ad valorem taxes, the yields of
which will be sensitive to price changes induced by the VAT—CIT substitution
and (b)personalincome taxes, the bases of which are altered by changes in
after-tax corporate profits. Aaron also assumes constant nominal yields of other
ad valorem taxes, an assumption which is particularly inconsistent with the
suggested "revenue sourceneutrality" interpretation of his yield criterion
(see note 6). In both our own and Aaron's analyses, however, the effects of
these inconsistencies should be of only secondary importance.
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notin effect in the United States. Thus, it is necessary to choose the
characteristics of the VAT,. and we will therefore be substituting an
idealized VAT for an actual CIT.
Given this freedom in defining the VAT, we were guided by the
following considerations in selecting a specific variant: First, as in
the case of the selection of a yield criterion, we sought political and
legislative realism. Secondly, and related to the first, we took into
account and were guided by the practices of other industrialized
nations that impose a VAT. Finally, desirable economic character-
istics, relating both to allocative efficiency and to the range of
specific objectives advanced by advocates of the VAT, have pro-
vided a basic set of criteria for VAT specification.
On the basis of these considerations the consumption-type VAT
was ultimately selected for analysis. This variant of the VAT has a
number of important characteristics which differentiateit from
others, particularly in terms of economic effects. In the follow-
ing discussion, we explain these differences in detail.
The main variants of the VAT are the consumption, income, and
gross product types. Under a VAT of the consumption type the
tax is invoiced on all sales other than exports. The seller is then
credited for VAT invoiced on all business purchases in determining
his net VAT liability. Thus, the apparent net base of the VAT con-
sists of final sales to households and government. Since the VAT
invoiced on government purchases represents both revenue and ex-
penditure of the government, the ultimate net VAT base consists
only of final sales to consumers, i.e., private domestic consump-
tion expenditure.
Although the VAT is invoiced on capital goods sales, that tax
payment is concurrently recouped by way of an "input tax" credit
against the gross VAT liability of the business purchaser of the
capital good. A VAT liability arises only at some future date when
the capital is transmuted into consumption output. As a result of
this immediate tax rebate, the tax funds of users of capital goods are
not tied up, as would otherwise occur if the VAT could only be re-
couped gradually through depreciation of the, capital good; in this
sense the exemption of investment is equivalent to instantaneous
(accelerated) depreciation under a profits tax (full write-off at the
time of purchase) [Musgrave, pp. 343-344]
9.Depending on the sophistication of depreciation policy a VAT of the
income type may also discriminate against investments of different duration.
However, under equivalent depreciation rules an income tax and the income-
type VAT would be equally discriminatory jMusgrave, pp. 338—343]. In any
event, the degree of discrimination under a VAT of the income type would be
small relative to that inherent in the gross-product variant.36 Substituting a Value-Added Tax for the Corporate Income Tax
Itis this instant-rebate feature which differentiates the consump-
tion-type VAT from its alternatives, the income and gross-product
types.'° Under a VAT of the income type the tax is "recouped"
only through depreciation of the capital good: investment purchases
are subject to tax but a credit is allowed only for depreciation.
Thus, the net base of the income-type VAT consists of net invest-
ment plus consumption. A gross-product VAT goes further: it is
levied on capital purchases but no credit is permitted for deprecia-
tion; the resulting net VAT base consists, therefore, of gross in-
vestment plus consumption. Effectively, a VAT on gross invest-
ment implies double taxation of capital goods: first at the time when
the capital good is purchased, and again when the capital good is
transmuted into consumption output and the latter is sold.
rn addition, the base of a gross-product VAT is highly sensitive to
the definition of the accounting period (differentiating intermediate
from capital purchases) while that of the income and consumption
types is not. Thus, the gross-product type strongly discriminates
against lengthy investments" On the other hand, the relation of
the consumption type to the life of a capital investment is com-
pletely neutral, but only at the expense of a total exemption of
capital goods from the tax (Shoup, pp. 251-252; Musgrave, pp.
336-346). Similarly, it is neutral to the degree of capital-intensive-
ness of production techniques.
As in the case of instantaneous depreciation under an income or
profits tax, the exemption of investment under a consumption-type
VAT logically requires that the investor receive an immediate refund
if he enjoys a net credit (excess of credits on intermediate and
capital goods purchases over liability on sales). Simply providing for
a carryover of net credits to future periods is not adequate, since the
value of a credit of a given dollar amount is reduced the longer the
refund is delayed. This consideration could be quite significant in
the case of newly formed or rapidly expanding firms, for which the
value of the credit would be greatly eroded if the credit were not
realized until years later. It is now the practice in all European
countries to refund net VAT credits without delay.
10. In addition to the gross-product, income and consumption types of VAT,
Shoup [1970, PP. 352—354] identifies the wages, or investment-income-exclusion,
variant, the base of which will be equal to consumption in any period only if
net investment is equal to profits (more generally, to nonwage income).
11. The invoice method of administering the collection of the VAT, de-
scribed in the text, breaks down if either an income or gross-product, rather
than consumption VAT, is applied. For a discussion of alternative methods of
administration, see Shoup [1970, pp. 257—2611.The Theoretical Structure of the Analysis 37
Forgoods in international trade, it is assumed that the VAT is
imposed on the destination principle, i.e., export sales are exempt
from the VAT while it is imposed as a border tax on imports)2
Value added at all stages in the course of production for export is
ultimately VAT-free since a full tax credit is enjoyed at the final
stage on all export-embodied inputs while export sales are exempted
from tax. Thus, the relation of the VAT itself to the terms of trade
is neutral: the imposition of the tax should leave export prices un-
changed and alter import and import-competing prices equivalently.
Finally, in contrast to (broadly based or partial) income taxes or
to an income or gross product VAT the consumption VAT is neutral
in its relation to consumption versus savings. In brief, the present
value of all future consumption is unaffected by the timing of con-
sumption, since the consumption-type VAT does not create a gap
between the gross- and net-of-tax rate of return to capital. Because
of this characteristic, a consumption-type VAT, by diverting re-
sources from consumption to investment, would stimulate growth
if it were substituted for a CIT or other income tax. This would be
in addition to any stimulus due to strengthened demand which
might result from the substitution of the VAT for the CIT on the
basis of a balanced budget criterion.
Primarily as a result of these allocatively neutral efficiency char-
acteristics the consumption-type VAT has commanded wider atten-
tion that its alternatives, and has been advanced as an alternative to
other types of taxes, partidularly the CIT. For these reasons, our
analysis is resthcted to the consumption type.
A final issue concerns the treatment of other taxes in determin-
ing the base of the VAT, and vice versa. In our analysis the VAT is
excluded from the bases of other taxes, e.g., the CIT, while all
components of value added, including other taxes, are included in
the VAT base. The reason for this treatment can be indicated using
indirect business taxes (LBT) as an example. Under our assump-
tions the VAT is invoiced at a uniform rate on VAT-exclusive but
IBT-inclusive value. Employing the invoice method, with each firm
invoicing VAT on sales (other than exports) and receiving a credit
for VAT invoiced on purchases, the ultimate ratio of aggregate net
VAT liabilities (excluding VAT on government purchases) to aggre-
gate consumption expenditures will equal the VAT rate. This equal-
12. A destination-based VAT is somewhat difficult to contemplate in the
case of the United States. Invoicing the tax on export sales might raise ques-
tions of an unconstitutional tax on exports. Exemption of imports would
require that some kind of credit for a hypothetical tax on imports be allowed,
since imports as intermediate goods cannot be distinguished in final transactions.38 Substituting a Value-Added Tax for the Corporate Income Tax
itywould break down if the VAT were imposed on IBT.exclusive
value unless all elements of IBT imposed at all previous stages (e.g.,
real property, excise, sales, motor vehicle and fuel taxes) could be
separately identified and excluded, at the stage in question, from all
purchases by the firm, which is obviously impossible.'3 The invoice
method would result in an indeterminate relationship between VAT
liabilities and consumption expenditures if each firm simply ex-
cluded from sales its own IBT in determining its net VAT liability,
because IBT imposed at earlier stages of production would still bear
the VAT at later stages. Thus, the ratio of total VAT yield to ag-
gregate consumption (exclusive of IBT) would diverge from the
VAT rate uniformly invoiced on IBT-exclusive sales, since the
IBT would have been only partially excluded.'4 In fact, the effective
VAT rate would necessarily be greater than the invoiced rate since a
portion of the IBT (from earlier stages of production) could not be
identified and excluded from the invoice sales basis. This incon-
sistency between the nominal and effective VAT rate disappears if
the IBT is uniformly included in the VAT invoiced sales base.
2.4TAX SHIFTING AND TAX-SUBSTITUTION-
INDUCED PRICE ADJUSTMENTS
2.4.1 The Translation of Tax Changes into
Price Changes
Asnoted previously, the crucial first-round response to a change
in tax structure is the effect of the tax change on commodity and
factor markets. In the analysis of the price effects of the tax sub-
stitution, macroeconomic effects have simply been ignored. Thus,
at this stage, we are interested only in those extremely short-run
impacts which will occur before any significant macroeconomic
reactions have manifested themselves. For even an intermediate-
term policy it will be necessary to take thse reactions into account,
13. Indirect business taxes in the national income accounts include federal
excise taxes, customs duties, and "nontaxes" (user charges and fees), state and
local sales taxes, motor vehicle licenses, property taxes, and nontaxes. In 1969,
indirect business tax revenue amounted to about $85 billion. Excise taxes and
sales tax accounted for 48.12 percent and property taxes for 36.25 percent of
this total.
14. This can easily be shown by a simple numerical example. Assume that
the economy consists of two firms, A and B, and a consumer, C. Before any
taxes are imposed, A has a sale of $100 to B, and B resells to C at $200. Suppose
that a 5 percent sales taxisimposed. A sells to B for $105. B adds value, as
above, of $100, and so he pays 5 percent tax on $205, or $10.25, and sells to
C for $205 +$10.25=$215.25.Total IBT is $5 +$10.25=$15.25.A
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andas discussed in the latter chapters of this book, these effects are
likely to be so substantial as to overwhelm the first-round conse-
quences. This will be true whether macroeconomic balance is re-
stored through a higher VAT rate than presented here, together with
a budget surplus or diminished deficit, or whether the balance is
restored through monetary stringency and higher interest and net
profit rates.
In principle, even the microeconomic consequences of the sub-
stitution should be traced through by means of a fully articulated
general equilibrium representation of interrelated commodity and
factor markets. Since this is beyond current capabilities, our analy-
sis is focused on the narrower issue of the probable initial effects of
the tax substitution on commodity prices, rather than moving
directly to economic effects, e.g., changes in the allocation of re-
sources. A completely fixed (price-inelastic) bill of final demands is
assumed as well as unchanged factor earnings (other than corporate
profits). The "price effects" we project actually represent "tax
allocation effects." Instead of observing the translation of tax
changes into price changes, a range of assumptions is employed con-
cerning the characteristics of this tax change-price adjustment re-
lationship. In this context, the term "tax shifting" is simply a short-
hand reference to these assumed tax allocation relationships. Thus,
our concern with the shifting of a particular tax in fact reflects our
inability to identify the ultimate effects of the tax change on rele-
vant economic magnitudes.
The alternative "tax shifting" assumptions employed inthe
analysis should, then, be viewed simply as alternative character-
izations of the initial effects of a change in tax instruments on
prices.'5
2.4.2CIT Shifting
Withreference to first-round price adjustments, the issue of CIT
shifting is concerned with the degree to which a reduction (increase)
in the CIT is translated into reductions (increases) in prices. This
B to C, $215.25 plus VAT imposed on a basis exclusive of VAT plus B'sindirect
tax only(i.e., on $215.25-$10.25=$205).This VAT, at 2 percent, is $4.10.
B therefore sells to C for $215.25 +$4.10=$219.35.Consumption expendi.
tures exclusive of all taxes are $200. Dividing this into total VAT revenue
($4.10), we get 2.05 percent, which is greater than the nominal VAT rate of
2 percent. This is so because elements of the sales tax in the earlier stages of
production cannot be excluded from sales in the later stages on which the VAT
is invoiced.
15. Discussions with Wassily Leontief have served to clarify both our under-
standing and exposition of this issue.40 Substituting a Value-Added Tax for the Corporate Income Tax
differssomewhat from previous discussions which have questioned
the effect of such a tax change on gross- or net-of-tax profits or rates
of return [Krzyzaniak and Musgrave]. However, under the assump-
tion of unchanged factor (except capital) earnings and final demands,
the effects of a change in the CIT on profits (gross or net) and on
prices will be directly related. Thus, in the following discussion
profit can be conceived of either as an aggregate or per unit of
output. Similarly, tax revenues may be interpreted interchangeably
as either aggregate or per unit. The objective is to devise a flexible
and internally consistent relationship between changes in CIT rates
and changes in per unit CIT liabilities (and hence, under current
assumptions, prices).
Consider a corporation with after-tax net profits of irN (total or
per unit), resulting from gross profits of ir taxed at a rate t, i.e.,
=(1-t)ir.
A tax change is then introduced which reduces the corporate tax
rate fromtto i.e., tax rates are reduced by a percentage
S =100(1— where 0<1. If it is assumed that the benefit
of the corporate tax reduction is entirely shifted to consumers, then
with unchanged unit sales net profits will not change as a result of
the rate reduction, i.e.,
=(1-7t)1r',





Corporate income tax revenue before the rate reduction was simply
tir. If gross profits had not changed as a result of the tax change,
revenue would have been reduced to ytir, implying a revenue loss of
(1 — However, because of the shifting of the tax benefit,
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since(1 —7t)is less than unity. If, for example, pretax profits were
$100 and the original tax rate were 50 percent, the presi.bstitution
revenue would be $50. The tax rate is then reduced to 25 percent
('y =0.5).With no shifting, revenue would be reduced to $25 and
net profits would rise to $75. However, if the full benefit of the tax
reduction isshifted forward, pretax profits fall to $66.67, tax
revenue falls to $16.67, and net-of-tax profits remain constant at
$50. Thus, forward shifting of the corporate tax savings (unshifting
in Aaron's terminology) results in greater corporate tax revenue
losses and price reductions than might be superficially anticipated
[Shoup, 1959, pp. 323—324].
Most generally, the true shifting parameter for the CIT, a, can be
defined as the ratio of the change in gross profits to the change in
tax liabilities, itself a consequence of a change in CIT rates, i.e.,
a == (2-4-1)
where =yt. Ifgross profits are expressed per unit of output, then
the numerator of this expression is simply the price-reduction bene-
fit to purchasers of a tax reduction of the amount specified in the
denominator, assuming that other components of price are un-
affected by the tax change.16
16. Tne CIT shifting parameter as defined here differs from that employed
by Aaron [p. 164], whose specification is correct only under the assumption
that the CIT is completely removed. That is, Aaron mistakenly assumes that the
reduction in CIT liability (per unit output) is predetermined, independently of
the value of the shifting parameter. In effect, he makes the reduction in CIT
liability a function only of the original level of gross profit (or CIT liability)
and of the change in the tax rate. The change in CIT liability under Aaron's
formulation is simply
=(t - t')r,
thechange in the tax rate multiplied by the original level of gross profit. The
purchaser price reduction is then a is the Aaron
shifting In fact, of course, that price reduction implies a further
reduction in profits and tax liabilities, a reduction which again must be as-
sumed to be shifted, ad infinitum (an infinite series that converges toward a
limit). Most importantly, these further reductions depend upon the value of the
shifting parameter. In consequence, it is necessary to expressas a function of
the true shifting parameter, a. Thus,= tir-tir;and from the definition
of a (above),
•(1 -at)
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Fromequation (2-4-1) the absolute change in (per unit) gross
profit (price) can be determined as a function of the degree of CIT
reduction, the shifting parameter, and the level of gross profit prior




since t= yt.(For ir; see the preceding footnote.)
This change in gross profit or price takes into account the fact that
if the benefits of the CIT reduction are shifted forward, a corres-
ponding initial price and gross profit reduction implies a further
reduction in tax liability, a reduction which in turn must be shifted
through further reduction in price and gross profit, ad infinitum.
In summary, the effect on price of a given reduction in effective
corporate income tax rates will necessarily depend on the degree of
CIT shifting. If any part of the CIT savings are shifted forward, gross-








andthe resultant price reduction is
- = = (1 (t - t')ir= (1




andonly when t'=0does a =a, i.e.,only when the CIT is fully removed is
Aaron's parameter "a" equal to the true shifting parameter a.Themost serious
consequence of this misspecification is that in cases of partial CIT reduction
the true shifting parameter will be a function of the effective tax rate. Since the
present analysis examines partial replacement of the CIT by the VAT, it is
necessary to employ the correct, although mathematically more complex,
shifting parameter a.The Theoretical Structure of the Analysis 43
tionin price. Only if the tax savings are completely retained by pro-
ducers, i.e., if gross profits remain constant and net profits increase
by the amount of the tax savings, will the CIT reduction have no
effect on prices.
Thus, itis necessary to specify CIT shifting parameters for all
industries. Unfortunately, there exists no consensus concerning the
degree to which the corporate income tax has been shifted in the
short run; empirical estimates range from no shifting to shifting in
excess of the increase in tax liabilities [Gordon; Krzyzaniak and
Musgrage].Classical price theory suggests no short-run shifting.
However, the diversity of empirical shifting estimates and the plaus-
ibility of market structure hypotheses which would give rise to some
degree of shifting dictate that alternative CIT shifting assumptions
be examined. In the empirical analysis, CIT shifting parameters
ranging between the logical extremes of zero (no shifting) and one
(full shifting) are employed. As has been discussed, these shifting
parameters are defined as the ratios of the change in gross profit
to the change in tax liability, where the latter reflects the full effects
of both (a) the initial change in tax rates, and (b) the change in tax
liability due to the change in gross (taxable) profit resulting from
shifting. Under full forward shifting of the CIT reduction net-of-
tax profit is unchanged, while under zero shifting grossprofitre-
mains constant.
In principle, it is necessary to specify a CIT shifting parameter for
each industry. While there is no basis for assuming that shifting
parameters will be equal for all industries, except under the classi-
cal assumption of zero short-run shifting, the lack of any reasonable
basis for determining differential CIT shifting parameters dictates
the provisional assumption that all industries shift equal propor-
tions of their reduced CIT liabilities. CIT shifting parameters that
vary by industry are not employed.
In summary, if any part of a given CIT reduction is shifted, the
result is a price reduction to the consumer. The reduction in price
is then a function of the degree of CIT reduction, of the value of the
shifting parameter (assumed equal for all industries), and of the in-
itial CIT liability per original dollar of sales (not equal for all indus-
tries). The higher the initial CIT liability, the greater the resultant
reduction in price. Thus, a very capital-intensive industry or an indus-
try with a very high profit rate or one which is highly incorporated
will experience above-average reductions in price due to the shifted
CIT reduction: the initial tax rate per dollar of sales will be higher,
and the consequent reduction in gross profit will be greater [Shoup,
1959], implying greater reductions in price on both counts.44Substituting a Value-Added Tax for the Corporate Income Tax
2.4.3 Effects of the VAT on Prices
Shiftingof the VAT, i.e., the relationship between the VAT rate
and prices (inclusive or exclusive of VAT itself) is also more complex
than might at first appear. Let P denote price prior to the intro-
duction of the VAT; P', the VAT-exclusive price after VAT un-
position; theVAT-inclusive price; and Z, the VAT rate. Then the
VAT-inclusive price will simply be (1 + Z)P'. As in the case of the CIT,
the VAT shifting parameter, j3, can be defined as the ratio of the
change in price to the change in tax liability, the comparison in each
case being to the situation prior to VAT introduction:
_(l+Z)P'-P
-.4
In the analysis of the VAT-CIT substitution the pre-VAT (but
post-CIT reduction) price is adjusted by the effect of the VAT, i.e.,
P' is expressed as a function of j3, Z, and P:
,_f 1 2-4 P (
Thus,in terms of VAT-inclusive prices
P
/\1+Z-(3Z)
= +z (i+- (2-4-5)
In this formulation, the effect of any failure fully to shift the VAT
(i.e., P> P') will be to reduce the VAT-exclusive value added, which
will in turn reduce the VAT liability, again ad infinitum.'7 As a re-
sult, the ultimate VAT-exclusive price will lie between the pre-VAT
17. The formulation here again contrasts with Aaron's [p. 164], which is
simply
(1 +Z)P' = P[1+Zb]
where b is Aaron's misspecification of the VAT shifting parameter. By inspec-
tion, it can be seen that Aaron's b is given by
&
(1+Z-j3Z)
whichis independent of the VAT rate, Z, only if 130 or 13 =1,i.e., if the
VAT is fully absorbed by profits or is fully shifted forward. Thus, the effec-
tive degree of VAT shifting assumed by Aaron differs from that nominally indi-
cated.
....The Theoretical Structure of the Analysis 45
priceP (unitary shifting) and [11(1 +Z)]P(zero shifting), depend-
ing on the degree of VAT shifting (13).
It should be noted that under a VAT of the consumption-type
only consumption purchases are ultimately subject to the tax. Since
credit is granted the buyer for VAT invoiced on business purchases,
investment and exports are effectively exempt from tax, while the
VAT on government purchases is simultaneously government revenue
and expenditure. However, this does not imply that effectively
exempt transactions will be unaffected by the imposition of the
VAT. Specifically, if producers fail to fully shift the VAT, then
VAT-exclusive prices will decline. Thus, imposition of the VAT
would reduce the effectivepriceof VAT-exempt purchases. This
result will be further examined in the later discussion of interindus-
try changes in tax liabilities.
In summary, the introduction of the VAT will increase VAT-
inclusive prices in each industry unless the VAT liability is fully
absorbed by profits or other factor earnings. Again, it is necessary
to specify a tax-shifting parameter. Unlike CIT shifting, for which
various alternative parameter values are examined, the VAT in our
model is assumed to be fully shifted forward by all industries.
The difference in treatment rests on three considerations. First, if
itis assumed that the VAT is not fully shifted forward, difficult
issues are raised concerning the actual incidence of the VAT and the
consequent changes in the yields of other taxes, e.g., the remain-
ing CIT (as will be discussed below). Secondly, full shifting of the
VAT is at least consistent with classical price theory, given that
final demand is completely price-inelastic, a condition implicit in our
assumption of an unchanged final demand vector. Finally, we have
argued that nonclassical assumptions concerning the shifting of the
CIT necessarily relate to net rates of return. Similar market con-
siderations must underlie a short-run failure to fully shift the VAT.
However, the "net rate of return" constraints have already been
incorporated through CIT shifting. It therefore seems redundant
to impose them a second time through less than full shifting of the
VAT since the two tax changes are simultaneous. As a result, full
forward shifting of the VAT is assumed throughout.
Thus, itis assumed that, in response to the VAT introduction,
producers mark-up their pre-VAT prices by the full amount of the
VAT liability. Furthermore, it is assumed that VA T-exclusiue prices
for each industry are uniform for all purchasers. For investment
goods purchases and exports, the effective price is VAT-exclusive,
since a full VAT credit is allowed. Since government incurs no net
VAT liability,only domestic consumers, having no tax credit,
pay at VAT-inclusive prices.46 Substituting a Value-Added Tax for the Corporate Income Tax
2.4.4 Price Formation and the Rate
of Depreciation
Becausein the short run the grossearningsof existing capital
goods are xiecessarily a kind of quasi-rent, short-run changes in
capital goods prices and the replacement cost of depreciated capital
should not influence output price under the usual profit maxi-
mization assumptions. However, the assessment of the VAT-CIT
substitution under a range of assumptions concerning the degree
of forward CIT shifting logically necessitates the inclusion in the base
of the VAT of depreciation at post-tax-substitution prices.
Specifically, classical price theory, positing profit-maximizing be-
havior on the part of producers, implies that a corporate profits tax
will not be shifted in the short run; any output-price configuration
which maximized profits prior to the introduction (removal) of the
CIT will also maximize profit after the CIT change. Short-run capital
earnings are indeed purely a quasi-rent. With unchanged final de-
mands (shifts in demand functions in which all final outputs are
held constant), the reduction of the CIT and introduction of the
VAT will simply increase prices by the amount of the VAT.
However, in this "classical case," whether depreciation is evalua-
ted at replacement cost or not, is a matter of indifference asfar as
the price effects of thesubstitution are concerned. VAT-exclusive
prices will be unchanged, and VAT-inclusive prices will be increased
by the VAT rate applied to total value added originally embodied in
a unit of final output. Since gross investment is effectively VAT-
exempt the replacement cost of depreciated capital is unaltered by
the tax substitution. Thus, the inclusion of depreciation at replace-
ment cost is consistent with the classical treatment of gross capital
earnings as a quasi-rent as long as classical assumptions regarding tax
shifting are also employed.
Any other short-run shifting assumptions necessarily violate the
classical model. To justify, e.g., forward shifting of a CIT, itis
necessary to introduce nonclassical theories of price determination,
oligopolistictheories relating to recognized interdependence be-
tween producers, "administrative" and "entry-restricting" pricing,
etc. A thorough exposition of these issues is beyond the scope of
the present study, but a central observation can be made: what-
ever the underlying price determination process, in any case in-
volving forward shifting of a CIT or nonshifting of a VAT, the price
determination must operate on the basis of net profits; i.e., net
capital earnings and rates of return must underlie price formation.
Thus, short-run shifting of CIT increases or of the benefits of CIT
reductions must result from (imperfectly competitive) market pres-
sures, or potential pressures, on net earnings. In consequence, whenThe Theoretical Structure of the Analysis 47
theclassical assumptions are given up, i.e., when forward shifting of
a CIT or less-than-full shifting of a VAT are introduced, net earnings
are logically implied as the determinants of prices. And for true net
earnings to determine price, changes in the replacement cost of
capital must be translated into equivalent changes in output price.'8
In an input-output model, the translation of changes in capital
goods prices into changes in output prices requires that depreciation
be removed from gross value added and included in interindustry
transactions. Depreciation is thus treated as having been contributed
by capital-goods-producing industries rather than by capital-goods-
using industries. Consistent with nonclassical shifting assumptions,
price will then be determined by net rather than gross value added.
It should be clearly understood that the issue of the appropriate
treatment of depreciation concerns criteria for price determination
and is not unique to the analysis of the consumption-type VAT. In
fact, the initial price effects of the tax substitution will be unaffected
by the inclusion of depreciation in value added or in interindustry
transactions regardless of the type of VAT (consumption, income, or
gross.product) examined, as long as the classical shifting assumptions
are maintained. Under nonclassical shifting assumptions, determina-
tion of prices by net earnings of capital (value added net of deprecia-
tion) requires that depreciation not be included unchanged in value
added. For the consumption and income types of VAT, prices will
be determined by net capital (and other) earnings only if deprecia-
tionisincluded at replacement cost, i.e.,in interindustry trans-
actions.
For a gross-product VAT, the necessary treatment in nonclassical
cases is even more complex, because gross investment (net invest-
ment plus depreciation) is included in the VAT base, and deprecia-
tion is taxed twice, first as a component of value added of final
output and second as a component of final output itself. Unlike
a consumption or income VAT, a gross-product type permits no
credit against final VAT liabilities of VAT on gross investment
(consumption type) or on depreciation (income type). To achieve a
given level of net earnings it is necessary to alter prices to reflect
both changes in replacement cost and the additional taxation of
depreciation.
The treatment of depreciation under a gross-product VAT is in-
18. As a result, Aaron's inclusion of depreciation in value added is acceptable
only under classical shifting assumptions, i.e., zero shifting of the CIT and full
shifting of the VAT. When, however, the Aaron model is used to experiment
with nonclassical shifting assumptions, it incorrectly includes depreciation in
value added,i.e., at original rather than replacement prices, and prices are
incorrectly determined by gross rather than net value added.48 Substituting a Value-Added Tax for the Corporate Income Tax
deedcomplex, regardless of the shifting assumptions employed.
Even under classical shifting assumptions, interpretation of de-
preciation and price formation depends on whether depreciation is
allocated to intermediate transactions or to value added. If to value
added, the net earnings of capital can be domonstrated to decline
by the amount of the VAT liability on depreciation, even though
VAT-exclusive capital goods prices and gross value added are un-
changed. This is simply because VAT on depreciation cannot be
credited against final VAT liabilities. However, if depreciation is
instead allocated to intermediate transactions, this will not imply,
as it does in the cases of VATs of the consumption and income
types, that net earnings will be unaffected: the VAT on deprecia-
tion as an intermediate good, i.e.,as a component of final value
added, is not the only tax on depreciation. The capital-using in-
dustry will itself be forced to pay the VAT on depreciation, and
true net earnings will decline by this amount.
In consequence, it is not sufficient to include depreciation in inter-
industry transactions for the analysis of nonclassical cases in which
prices are to be determined by net capital earnings. To achieve any
given level of net earnings it is necessary to adjust depreciation for
both changes in capital goods prices and the noncreditabiity of VAT
on depreciation. If depreciation for some industry is D at original
capital goods prices, and ifis an index of VAT-exclusive capital
goods prices after the tax substitution, then the value of deprecia-
tion which must enter final prices, if a predetermined level of net
earnings is to be attained, is PKD(]. +Z)2,where Z is the VAT rate.
Simply including D as an intermediate transaction would result in a
contribution to final output price of PKD(1 +Z),and net earnings
would fall short of the predetermined level by ZPKD, the net VAT
liability of the capital-using industry on account of depreciation. The
"true" replacement cost of capital now includes the noncreditable
VAT, i.e., becomes PKD(1 +Z).To obtain a given level of net
earnings this amount must be included in total value added em-
bodied in final output. The depreciation contribution to final output
price is then [PKD(l + + Z)=PKD(l+Z)2.The VAT
liability on sales attributed to depreciation is simply PKD(l +Z)Z;.
deducting this amount from the depreciation component of final
(VAT-inclusive) sales price, we are left with the VAT-inclusive re-
placement cost of capital, i.e.,
PKD(i. +Z)2-PKD(1+Z)Z=PKD(].+2Z+- Z-Z2)
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Thus,itis necessary (a) to include depreciation at VAT-exclusive
replacement capital prices, i.e., as an intermediate good, and (b)
to augment this amount by the VAT liability on depreciation (1 ÷ Z),
ifa given level of net earnings is to be achieved under a gross-product
VAT.
To reiterate, under our assumptions, price is determined by value
added net of true economic depreciation (capital consumption evalu-
ated at replacement cost). This is equivalent to treating capital earn-
ings as quasi-rents if the corresponding classical shifting assumptions
are employed (zero CIT and full VAT shifting), since in this case
consumption prices would rise just by the amount of the VAT and
capital goods prices would be unchanged. It is also consistent with
nonclassical cases in which prices change through the influence of
tax shifting on net earnings, and thus on value added net of true
depreciation.
2.5FISCAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE
TAX SUBSTITUTION
2.5.1 Revenue and Expenditure Effects
TheVAT-CIT substitution will have both direct and indirect
effects for all levels of government. Directly, the tax involves a loss in
CIT revenue and a more-or-less compensatory increase in revenues
from the VAT. Indirectly, any changes induced in prices of govern-
mental-purchased goods and services by the tax substitution will
alter either government expenditure or real levels of government
demand, while changes in consumer prices may lead to adjustments
of public employees' wages. Also, changes in prices and wages in
the rest of the economy will lead to secondary changes in the rev-
enue yields of other taxes, and in each of these cases the effects may
be quite different at different levels of government.
For a first-round analysis of the change in tax structure, the
following effects are considered: Direct changes in VAT and CIT
revenue yields due to increases or decreases in the rates of these
taxes; indirect changes in VAT and CIT revenues due to changes in
value added or in corporate profits resulting from the tax substitu-
tion, a consequence of the direction and degree of tax shifting; and
finally, changes in the level of nominal government expenditure,
due to price changes, assuming a fixed bill of real final demands of
government.
It is specifically, if unrealistically, assumed that the nominal yields
of taxes other than the VAT and the CIT are unaffected by the tax
substitution. A more complete analysis would incorporate changes50 Substituting a Value-Added Tax for the Corporate Income Tax
inother revenues following from effects on factor earnings and
prices, requiring that the VAT be sufficient to compensate for these
as well as changes in the CIT and in government prices. Adjust-
ments of actual government demands and of public employees'
wages are considered second-round responses to the change in tax
structure and are ignored in the formal analysis. Differential inter-
governmental fiscal consequences are briefly considered at a later
stage. For present purposes government is viewed in integrated,
national income accounts terms.
2.5.2CIT Revenue Loss
Althoughthe tax substitution involves a simultaneous reduction
or elimination of the CIT and compensating imposition of the VAT,
it is useful heuristically to view the change in tax structure as a series
of individual tax changes. Thus, the revenue loss resulting from a re-
duction in effective CIT rates can first be considered independently
of later changes in VAT rates.
The CIT revenue loss is straightforward if either (a) the CIT is
completely repealed or (b) the benefits of the CIT reduction are not
shifted forward in the form of lower prices (and profits). If the
CIT is repealed, the nominal revenue loss is simply the prior yield of
this tax. Regardless of any resultant changes in profits, the revenue
loss is unchanged. If the CIT is only partially eliminated, then the
revenue loss will simply equal the change in yield at the original level
of profits only if the benefits of CIT reduction are not shifted for-
ward, reducing gross-of-tax profits.
Shifting of the CIT will, however, reduce taxable profits, resulting
in a revenue loss greater than would be implied by the change in rates
at original profit levels. Recall that CIT shifting was defined as the
ratio of the change in profits to the change in tax liabilities:
iT- iT'
tiT— tiT
whereas before a represents the shifting parameter, ir the level of
gross profits (aggregate or per unit output), t the tax rate, and primes
(') indicate post-tax-substitution values.
The change in CIT revenues,Tc, is then simply
IXTC =tir- t'ir'
(1-at) tir—t' iT (1-at)
—(t—t')
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Becauseof the shifting-induced decline in taxable profits, the ulti-
mate CIT revenue loss is a multiple [1/(1 —at')]of the loss due to
the rate reduction alone [(t —t')ir].
2.5.3 VAT Revenue and Interdependence in
Tax Yields
Therevenue gained by imposition of the VAT is similarly depend-
ent on the degree to which the VAT itself is shifted. If the VAT is
fully shifted forward through higher prices, then value added (price)
exclusive of the VAT is unaffected by the imposition of the tax.
Thus, VAT revenue would be given by the VAT rate multiplied by
taxable(consumption) expenditure (accumulated value added).
However, if the VAT is not fully shifted, then value added exclusive
of the VAT will decline, resulting in a concomitant decline in VAT
revenue.
Thus, if the value of taxable sales, prior to imposition of the VAT
but after CIT reduction, is denoted by P' (previously denoting price),
the VAT rate by Z, and the degree of VAT shifting by 13, then the
VAT-exclusive value of taxable sales after introduction of the VAT,
P',is
=+ z - pz (2-5-2)




However, the ultimate change in tax revenue resulting from the
imposition of the VAT is still more complex, unless the VAT is fully
shifted forward. First, it is necessary to identify the component of
price (the factor return) that bears the unshifted part of the VAT.
Provisionally, assume that the failure fully to shift the VAT is re-
flected by a reduction in profit (aggregate and per unit of output).
Then, as a result of the shifting of part of the VAT burden to profits,
profits will decline by P' -F",which will result in a decline in
corporate income tax revenues. With the given (post-CIT-reduction)
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where vis the change in CIT revenue resulting from the propor-
tion of the VAT liability borne by profits. vwill be zero only
if j3 1,i.e., if the VAT is fully shifted, or ift=0,i.e., the CIT
is totally repealed. The full change in revenue following the im-
position of the VAT is, then,
=ATv+
-(z +(.-Z+t3Z
— +Z- \1 +Z-13ZJ
—[(1—t' +
— L1 + Z-aZJ (2-5—5)
Ofcourse, this would not be the end of the tax revenue effects of
incomplete forward shifting of the VAT, e.g., personal income tax
liabilities would be altered through reductions in dividends or capital
gains. Furthermore, any shifting of the CIT savings would generate
additional reductions in profits and prices, and hence in VAT and
CIT revenues. Most generally, any backward shifting of the VAT
will simultaneously affect federal and state CIT, other income tax,
and possibly non-income-tax revenues. Similarly, changes in prices,
through either the forward shifting of the CIT reduction or back-
ward shifting of the VAT, will reduce government revenues from
existing ad valorem excises, even if final demands are unaffected by
the price and disposable income changes. Thus, unless the rates
of these taxes are simultaneously altered, their revenue yields will
also be affected.
In brief, revenue yields of different taxes are interdependent, and
this interdependence, not to mention the identification of economic
effects, would require that a tax substitution be examined in a
general equilibrium context. The model used here to assess the
effects of a VAT-CIT substitution goes only partially in this direc-
tion. A number of artificial assumptions have had to be made to
render the problem tractable; one of the most important of these
is the assumption that the nominal yields of other taxes will be
unaffected by the VAT-CIT changes.
2.5.4Change in Government Expenditure
Sincegovernment final demands are assumed to be constant and
changes in public employee wages and in transfer payments (e.g.,
relief to needy) induced by the VAT-CIT substitution are relegated
to later-round adjustments, government expenditure will be alteredThe Theoretical Structure of the Analysis 53
onlyby changes in the prices of government-purchased goods and
services. Since the VAT invoiced on government purchases in the
aggregate represents both revenue and expenditure, it makes no
difference whether VAT is charged on government purchases and
the amount entered as additional VAT revenue, or whether govern-
ment purchases are exempt and government prices are VAT-ex-
clusive.
The reduction or repeal of the CIT will benefit government to the
degree to which CIT savings are translated into lower prices. Em-
ploying the yield criterion that the government surplus or deficit be
unchanged by the tax substitution, CIT shifting reduces the total
VAT revenue required to compensate for the CIT.
If the VAT is fully shifted, government prices after the imposi-
tion of the VAT will be determined only by the reduction or repeal
and the degree of shifting of the CIT. However, if the VAT is not
fully shifted, but is partially or completely absorbed by profits or
other factor earnings, then government prices, exclusive of VAT,
willdecline, on the reasonable assumption that VAT-exclusive
prices are identical for all purchasers. In brief, a firm cannot easily
distinguish between ultimately taxable and nontaxable sales, and
the failure to shift the VAT fully will result in price reductions in the
case of sales entitled to a VAT credit. Even if the firm could dis-
tinguish between taxable and nontaxable transactions, the main-
tenance of VAT-exclusive prices on nontaxable sales, when VAT-
exclusive prices of taxable sales declined, would necessitate an
inherently unstable dual price system.
In fact, it is assumed throughout that the VAT is fully shifted
forward. Thus, government expenditures will be affected only by
the possible shifting of the CIT reduction.
2.6THE INPUT-OUTPUT MODEL
ANALYTICAL SYNTHESIS
2.6.1 Overview of the Model
Allthe foregoing elements, including (a) the criteria for a com-
pensating tax substitution, (b) the special characteristics of the
consumption-type VAT, (c) price formation, tax shifting, and the
appropriate treatment of depreciation under nonclassical pricing
assumptions, and (d) direct and indirect fiscal implications of the tax
substitution are structurally integrated in the context of an input-
output model. Essentially, the input-output model provides a frame-
work for a static general equilibrium price determination within
which the first-round economic effects of a compensated tax sub-
stitution can be identified.54 Substituting a Value-Added Tax for the Corporate Income Tax
Ininput-output analysis, price for each industry's output is de-
fined as the total value of primary resources directly and indirectly
used in the production of a unit of final output. Ultimately, this
price consists of imports and value added, with value added defined
to include all primary factor income, including employee com-
pensation, profits, and all other factor payments. If output is meas-
ured in constant dollars, i.e., as the value of output prior to the tax
substitution, then the unit price of each industry's output is initially
unity by definition. Any change in this "price per dollar of final
output" will then measure the change in value added (including
imports) per original dollar of final output resulting from the tax
substitution.
Defined in this way, output price for any industry is related to
value added of all industries by a set of technical input coefficients
which specify total inputs (direct and indirect) from each industry
required to produce a dollar of final output of the given industry.
Thus, given the total input coefficients, value added per unit of
output for all industries can be transformed into output price for
any particular industry. A change in any price is then necessarily
the consequence of a change in the value added of some industry or
industries. As a result, the input-output relationships between indus-
tries imply that a change in the value added of any industry will be
passed forward automatically as a price change of other industries.
In input-output practice, depreciation, or capital consumption
can be treated either as a component of gross value added or as an
intermediate input. Depreciation is conventionally included in value
added simply because of the empirical difficulty of allocating it over
capital-goods-producing industries. However, by use of a capital
flow table, supplemented by a number of assumptions concerning
the relationships between investment and output, itispossible
todistribute depreciation over capital-goods-producer industries.
Because net value added is logically implied as the determinant of
price in cases of short-run shifting of the CIT, depreciation allow-
ances by industry have been subtracted from both gross investment
and gross value added and have been added to interindustry trans-
actions. 19
19.Specifically, two basic assumptions are required to estimate capital con-
sumption on an interindustry basis. First, depreciation of capital goods supplied
by industry i to industry j is assumed to be proportionate to the stock of 1th
industry capital goods in industry I in the previous period, i.e.,
=
where isdepreciation of the 1th good in the 1th industry in period t,Kjj,t_i
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Asa result of the depreciation adjustment, the price effects of the
VAT-CITsubstitutionincorporatethetax-substitution-induced
changes in the prices of capital good inputs: capital consumption per
unit of output is evaluated at postsubstitution replacement cost
rather than at original cost. Value added will then include only net
earnings of capital, in addition to other factor incomes. However,
because only final consumption sales constitute the base of the
consumption-type VAT after allowances and credits, only value
added directlyor indirectly entering consumption isultimately
subject to tax.
It must be reiterated that this treatment of depreciation, enter-
ing it into prices at replacement cost, is equivalent to treating capital
earnings as quasi-rents if the corresponding classical tax shifting
assumptions are employed (zero CIT and unitary VAT shifting).
In this case consumption prices rise just by the amount of the VAT,
capital goods prices are unchanged, and the treatment of deprecia-
tion, whether as an interindustry transaction or as a component of
gross value added, is a matter of indifference. However, only the
former treatment of depreciation (as an interindustry transaction,
i.e.,at replacement cost)is consistent with nonclassical shifting
assumptions, under which prices respond to the effects of tax
changes on net earnings of capital.
imated by the reciprocal of the average useful life of thecapital good in the
1th industry. Secondly, the growth rates of all types of capital goods stocks in
an industry are assumed to be uniform, equal to the normal (average) growth
rate of real output of the industry, gj, i.e.,
Kj3,t - =
ii,t-1
Thus, the unobserved stock in the preceding period, K13 can be determined
on the basis of gross investment, given by the capital flow table, and the
rates of growth and depreciation, g1 and d(j:
=g1+d13
Depreciation, by user and supplier industry, is then
D d
U ii
The details of the conversion of depreciation into interindustry transactions
are contained in Appendix A, section 4.56 Substituting a Value-Added Tax for the Corporate Income Tax
Inthe analysis of the first-round effects of the tax substitution, it
is assumed that the constant-dollar bill of final demands (by indus-
try) and the input-output coefficients (inclusive of depreciation) are
unaffected by the tax changes. Demand and input-substitution
responses to the tax-induced changes in relative prices are relegated
to later-round reactions. Thus, .the initial (first-round) price effects
of the tax substitution must be interpreted primarily as indices of
potential demand and production-process responses to the tax
substitution, rather than as price changes which would actually
be observed.
The substance of the foregoing model can be outlined concep-
tually in terms of its application to the VAT-CIT substitution. The
effects of the tax substitution on prices can be most conveniently
broken into two independent phases: First, the reduction in the CIT,
and second, the imposition of the VAT. In each phase, the effect
on prices results from tax-substitution-induced changes in value
added (defined inclusive of CIT and VAT liabilities).
A reduction in effective CIT rates will have no effect on prices if
reduced CiT liabilities are simply converted into higher net profits.
However, if the CIT savings are shifted to purchasers, then to that
degree gross-of-tax profits, value added, and hence price, will de-
cline. Note that a decline in the value added of any one industry will
be reflected in the prices of all industries that use the product of
that industry as an intermediate good.
Thus, the effect of the CIT reduction on prices is a function of
the degree of CIT reduction, of the magnitude of the CIT shifting
parameter (assumed to be equal for all industries), and of the initial
direct and indirect CIT liability per original dollar of output.
In the second phase, introduction of the VAT will increase value
added in each industry (inclusive of VAT) if the VAT is fully shifted
forward in higher prices. However, if the VAT is of the consumption
type and is fully absorbed by profits or other factor earnings, then
under the assumption of equal VAT-exclusive prices for all pur-
chasers aggregate value added (inclusive of net VAT) will decline,
i.e., consumption prices will be unchanged by the VAT, while effec-
tive prices for nonconsumption purchasers will decline by the
bated) VAT liability. At intermediate degrees of VAT shifting, value
added may increase or decrease, but in any event will increase by
less than the nominal VAT liability.
If the VAT is fully shifted forward, VAT-exclusive prices will be
determined only by the reduction in and shifting of the CIT, i.e.,
prices after the CIT reduction but before the VAT introduction are
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VAT-inclusiveprices will be known as soon as the VAT rate is de-
termined.
In addition, the CIT-compensating VAT rate is dependent only
on the previously determined VAT-exclusive prices. The selected
criterion for VAT yield is simply that net change in government
revenue equal net change in government expenditure, i.e., that the
net change in the government surplus be zero. The net change in
government surplus after the CIT reduction but before the VAT is
given by the algebraic sum of the decrease in CIT revenue (direct
decrease due to rate reduction, and indirect decrease due to shift-
ing) and the decrease in government expenditure (due to reductions
in the prices of governmentally purchased goods and services, re-
sulting from CIT shifting). In addition, government expenditure
will be increased by the amount of the VAT invoiced on govern-
ment purchases; however, since the VAT on government purchases
is government revenue as well as expenditure, these items cancel
out and can be ignored, i.e., government can be assumed to pay at
VAT-exclusive prices. Thus, with full VAT shifting the required
VAT revenue is known as soon as the CIT is reduced.2° The base of
the VAT, private domestic consumption at VAT-exclusive prices, is
also known if the VAT is fully shifted. Therefore, the required VAT
rate is simply the ratio of the pre-VAT net change in government
surplus to the VAT base, both computed after reduction of the
CIT. The resultant VAT rate will be just sufficient to produce a net
change in government revenue equal to the net change in expendi-
ture, i.e., an unchanged monetary surplus or deficit. Given the VAT
rate and VAT-exclusive prices, VAT-inclusive consumption prices
can then be determined.
In the more general case of incomplete VAT shifting, VAT-ex-
clusive prices would not be known until the VAT rate was deter-
mined. That is, VAT-exclusive prices would depend on the shifted
VAT rate. In this case, not examined here, the VAT rate and prices
(both inclusive and exclusive of VAT) would have to be determined
simultaneously.
2.6.2The Analytics of the Model
Themathematical representation of the foregoing model is straight-
forward. Consider a depreciation-adjusted input-output system, in
which estimates of depreciation (use of capital services) are added to
20. If the VAT were not fully shifted, then VAT-exclusive prices of
ernrnent purchases would decline further with the introduction of the VAT,
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interindustryflows and correspondingly subtracted from gross value
added and from gross investment for each industry. Final demand (y)
is disaggregated into private domestic consumption (c),government
purchases (g), net private domestic investment (1), and exports (e).2'
Netvalue added per dollar of output (u)isdivided into gross cor-
porate profits(ir) and other elements (o), including imports.22
The input-output model is thus given by
x =(I-A) 1 (c +g + i + e) (2-6-1)
p' =v'(I —A)1=(ir+ o)' (I —A)1 (2—6—2)
where I is an n by n identity matrix, A is an n by n matrix of direct
requirements coefficients, x is a vector of total output, p is a vector
of prices, and primes indicate transposes.
Equations (2-6-1) and (2-6-2) represent two veiws of an input-
output system. Equation (2-6-1) relates total outputs of all indus-
tries to final demands from all industries. Equation (2-6-2) relates
final output prices of all industries to primary factor costs of all
industries and reveals the cost structure of producing a dollar of final
output in terms of the primary resources eventually used. These two
equations indicate the dual aspects of the input-output system.
Equation (2-6—2) is appropriate for answering the question: What
would be the relative price consequences if all or part of the corporate
income tax were replaced by a consumption-type value-added tax,
assuming that the bills of real final demand, c, g,i, and e and the
input-output structure, A, are unchanged by the tax substitution?
Let S/100 =sbe the uniform proportionate reduction in initial
effective CIT rates. The pre- and postsubstitution CIT rates for in-
dustry jaredenoted by t1 and tj[tj(l-s)],respectively. The
CIT shifting parameter for industry j,is defined as the ratio of
the change in gross profit to the change in tax liability, i.e.,
= = 1,2,..,n, (2-6-3)
where asterisks (*) represent post-CIT-reduction values. As a con-
sequence of the CIT reduction and shifting, per unit value added for
industry j,is reduced by
21. Each of these final demands represents a vector by industry.
22. Value added and its components are again vectors by industry.The Theoretical Structure of the Analysis 59
1— =1,2,...,n,(2—6—4)
assuming that other value-added elements remain unchanged. Thus,
the per unit value added for industry jafterthe CIT reduction but
before the VAT introduction is simply




for j= 1,2,..., n.For the reasons indicated in section 2.4.2, it is
assumed that a is uniform across the industries.
Therefore, value added for all industries after CIT reduction is
=U' — sir'tb, (2—6—7)
where irisa 1 X n row vector containing initial gross profits,
tisan n Xndiagonal matrix containing initial CIT rates, and 1, is
an n X n diagonal matrix containing the elementsFrom equa-
tion (2-6-2), the price vector of final output after the CIT reduc-
tion, in terms of value added, is
=v*'(I—A)-1, (2—6—8)
with the price reduction equal to sirtb(l - Since it is assumed
that the VAT is fully shifted forward, the VAT-inclusive price vector
after the VAT introduction is simply the price vector p2 multiplied
by 1 plus the VAT rate, i.e.
(1 + = (1+Z)v*'(I—A)1 (2—6—9)
where Z is VAT rate. With the introduction of the VAT,can be
interpreted as a vector of VAT-exclusive prices.
The VAT rate is still not determined. To solve for the VAT rate,
individual gross changes in government revenue and expenditure
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satisfythe yield criterion,an unchanged monetary surplus (or
deficit), net changes in revenue and expenditure must be equal.
On the revenue side, the reductions in CIT rates cause original
government revenue to decrease by an amount slT'txplusan addition-
al amount s(1 —s)irtbtxif the tax salving is shifted forward. CIT
revenue will not be further reduced since the VAT is assumed to be
fully shifted forward. Second, the introduction of VAT increases
government revenue by an amount equal to Zp'2 (c + g), with c
and g standing for private domestic consumption expenditures
and government purchases at their original values. It can be assumed
that, since the government is not itself a VAT-payer, it will not enjoy
a credit for the VAT invoiced to it on its purchases from the tax-
paying sector. It therefore pays the VAT-inclusive price on all pur-
chases, including its purchases of capital goods, but correspondingly
it is the recipient of these invoiced tax revenues.23 The net change in
the government revenue is thus
= (c +g)—sir'tx — s(1—s)ir'tbtx. (2-6—10)
On the expenditure side, the change in the government expendi-
ture is simply the difference between the post-tax substitution and
the original expenditure, i.e.,
=(1+ -p'g. (2-6-11)
SettingG = to satisfy the equal yield condition and utiliz-
ing equations (2-6—2), (2—6—7), and (2—6—8), a quadratic equation
in Z, the VAT rate, can be derived:
k1Z2 +(k1-k2)Z-k2=0, (2-6—12)
where k1 and 1z2 are scalars with
k1 =v'(I—A) —sir'tb(I —A)
and
k2 =sir'tx +s(1 —s)7r'tbtx—s7r'tb(I—A)1g.
23. As hasbeennoted repeatedly, under the constant surplus condition
the VAT treatment of government purchases is, in the aggregate, a matter of
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Examiningthe elements of these expressions:
1. sirtx= primaryloss in CIT revenue, an increasing function of
the degree of CIT reduction.
2.s(1 -s)?T'tbtx=secondaryloss in CIT revenue resulting from
any partial or full shifting of the CIT reduction. The loss increases
and then, when the CIT reduction approximates 50 percent, de-
creases at a diminishing rate. Also, it increases at an increasing rate
with increases in the shifting parameter.
3. sir'tb(I —A)1g=reductionin government expenditure re-
sulting from lower VAT-exclusive prices due to CIT shifting. It in-
creases at a diminishing rate with increases in the degree of CIT
reduction. It also increases, but at an increasing rate, as the CIT
shifting parameter increases.
4. v'(I -A)1c=totalprivate domestic consumption expendi-
ture before the tax substitution.
5. —A)1c=reductionin private domestic consumption
expenditure due to CIT shifting, increasing at a diminishing rate with
increases in the degree of CIT reduction and at an increasing rate
with increases in the CIT shifting parameter.
Thus, k1 and k2 can be easily interpreted: k1 is total private dom-
estic consumption expenditure after the CIT reduction but before
the VAT introduction; k2 is change in the government surplus or
deficit after the CIT reduction but before the VAT introduction.
Since the VAT invoiced to the government on its purchases repre-
sents equal amounts of increases in government expenditure and
revenue, the invoiced VAT does not appear in k2, nor does governS
ment expenditure appear in k1. Therefore, k1 is the VAT base and
k2, the VAT revenue required to preserve the government budget
position before the tax change. Thus the solution of equation






That is, the required VAT rate is equal to the ratio of the required
compensatory VAT revenue to the VAT base. With the VAT rate
determined, the price equations (2-6-8) and (2-6-9) provide, respec-
tively, VAT-exclusive and -inclusive prices after the tax substitu-
tion.24
24. Since prices were initially unity by definition, postsubstitution prices
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Aggregateprice indices are obtained from these indices of in-
dividual prices. For domestic private consumption the index is com-
puted by dividing consumption expenditures at VAT-inclusive prices
by the consumption expenditures prior to the tax substitution, i.e.,
= (2-6-14)
Similarly, the VAT-exclusive price indices for government purchases,
net investment, and exports are respectively:
(2-6-15)
P1 = (2-6-16)
= (2-6-17)